jon.kiparsky actual makes a good point, that you shouldn't rely on obscurity for the strength of your crypto system. What is strange, though, is that even though the security community accepts this truism, notice that most organizations still consider it a mistake to even give away that information to the enemy. You want the enemy to first waste time and resources figuring out which cryptosystem is being used before they spend time focusing on attacks on that system.
This is true in some cases - I guess they would say they're not relying on obscurity, but all the same they're going to use it. But of course, this is sort of foolish, since a crypto system whose security is improved by obscurity is one that's so completely broken that you wouldn't use it in any case. The only way this might conceivably help you is if you're using some system and a new attack is developed for that system - this would buy you a little bit of time to change systems, I suppose.
And of course, trying to keep your protocols secret only helps you when you're in control of both sides of the encryption. So basically, it's going to be possible for storage and for your corporate intranet and stuff like that.